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the stockholders in Massachusetts did not belong to any corpora-
tion in that state, to which the 'Massachusetts laws, to which alone
they were amenable, had any application.
The plaintiffs must first enforce New Hampshire laws upon
those who are citizens of New Hampshire, or those upon wham
service has been made, within this jurisdiction or those who are
willing to submit voluntarily to this jurisdiction, and when such
stockholders as thus become proper parties to the bill and who are
solvent have paid the whole debt, if they should find that their
remedy for contribution against the stockholders in Massachusetts
is in any way defective (which we presume will not be the case),
they must learn wisdom by experience, and not become associated
with stickholders from other states, another time, without some
contract among themselves, for contribution, which will bind all
parties under any jurisdiction. CCase discharged.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.'
SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.X
AGENT.
Exceeding his Powers becomes Principal, and- acquires the Rights
of one.-One who is simply employed to sell goods and pay over to his
employer the money received from the sales, has no authority to
exchange such money with a third person; and if he does so, and
receives in exchange a counterfeit bill, he may maintain an actiori
in his own name to recover back the money paid out by him for it; and
it is not necessary, before bringing such action, to offer to return the
counterfeit bill: Kent v. Bornstein, 12 Allen.
BANKRUPTCY.
Right to Bankrupt's Property omitted from Schedule-Jurisdiction
of Equity to annul Discharge, &c.-Whether property fraudulently
omitted from his schedule belongs to his assignee for distributioli among
his creditors, or whether it would be appropriated by a court of equity
in satisfaction of the debt of a creditor, at whose instance the court set
aside the bankrupt's discharge for fraud- Quw're? But if it did belong
I From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 12 of his Reports.
9 From J. Z. George, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 39 li. Reports.
3 From Ihon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 47 of his Reports.
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to the assignee, the court would nevertheless entertain a bill to annul
the bankrupt's discharge for fraud, and to render a decree against him
for the complainant's debt: Edwards v. Gibbs et al., 39 Mi.
Vested Remainder must be returned in Schedule.-The wilful omission,
from his schedule, by a bankrupt, of his interest in a vested estate in
remainder to take effect in possession after the termination of a precedent
life estate, is such a fraud as will vitiate his discharge: Id.
CHAMPERTY.
Right to sue for a Wrong not assignable.-A right of action to sue for
a wrongful conversion of property is not assignable: such an assignment
would be but a mere transfer of a right to sue for a wrong, and is
against public policy and void. Nor is -the rule different where the
assignment is a mere release, or quit-claim of the assignor's right. See
Goodwin v. Lloyd, 8 Porter 237; Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297;
I)unklin v. Wilkins, 5 Ala. Rep. 199; McGoon v. Ankeny, I1 Ill. Rep.
558; 3 Littell 41 : Davis v. .erndon, 39 Mi.
A hattel hhdI, adversely by another not assignable.-An assignment
of a chattel in the adverse possession of a third party claiming it as his
own, and which is known to the assignee at the time, is against public
policy and void. See Brown v. Lipscomb, 9 Porter 472; Young v- Fer-
guson, 1 Littell 298; McGoon v. Ankeny, 11 Ill. Rep. 558; Dunklin V.
Wilkins, 5 Ala. Rep. 199: Id.
COMMON CARMr.
What constitutes a Common- Carrier-Case in Judgment.-Where a
planter, employing his wagons in hauling his cotton crop to market, and
habitually lading them on their return trips with goods to be transported
for hire, receives such goods and executes his xeceipt thereforT under-
taking to deliver them to the consignee in good order and without delay
at the customary rate of charges, he will be responsible as a common
carrier. See Gibson v. Hunt, 1 Salk. 249; Satterlee v. Grant, 1 Wend.
272; Edwards on Bail. 430: Earrison v. Roy, 89 Mi.
Common Carrier bound to transport Goods under his (ommon-Law
Responsibility.-A common carrier is bound by law for a reasonable
reward, to receive and carry goods offered for transportation, subject to
all the responsibilities legally incident to his employment. He has no
right to refuse to receive and transport goods because the shipper will
not assent to a special contract of shipment which limits his common-
law responsibility; and if he do so he will be liable to an action for
damages: Southern Express Co. v. ,Moon, 39 Mi.
Limitations of Carrieres Responsibility by Special Contract.-Whether
a common carrier has a right to limit, by special contract with the
shipper, his common-law responsibility as an insurer of the goods in-
trusted to him for. transportation: Qua're P But, conceding that he can,
the assent of 4he shipper must be express, and upon a sufficient consi-
deration, and be freely and fairly given with a full knowledge of the
contract and of the legal rights thereby waived, and not obtained by the
fraud and circumvention of artfully-contrived printed receipts thrust
upon the shipper in the hurry and press of railroad travel, or under other
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circumstances not favorable to a full understanding of the force and
effect of the contract: Id.
Limitations do not extend to iVegligence.-Exceptions in a common
carrier's receipt, limiting his common-law responsibility, are strictly con-
strued against the carrier, and are never extended to relieve from
responsibility for a loss occasioned by his own negligence: Id.
Same.-In case of loss of goods by a common carrier, he will be
responsible, unless he show affirmatively that the loss was occasioned by
a cause within some one of the exceptions in his receipt: Id.
Common-Law" Responsibility of Common Carriers.-A common car-
rier, when there is no special contract limiting his responsibility, is
bound as an insurer of goods received by him for transportation, as
against loss occasioned by any cause other than the act of God, the
public enemy, or by the conduct of the shipper: Id.
Liability for Goods destroyed by Fire.-The plaintiff delivered a
quantity of beer barrels at one of the freight houses of the defendant,
at East Albany, for transportation to Boston, directed to a person in
that city. The barrels were not tallied, counted, booked, or receipted,
according to the usual custom of the company, nor did the plaintiff ask
to have them tallied, &e.; but they were delivered at the usual place for
transacting such business, and received by persons in the employ of the
defendant; and the defendant's agent was present when a portion of the
property was delivered, and directed where it should be put. The bar-
rels were accidentally destroyed, by fire on the same evening they were
delivered, and while in the possession of the defendant, in its freight-
house: lield, that the defendant received the property for the purpose
of transportation, and not as a warehouseman; and that it was liable as
a common carrier, for the value: Coyle v. The Western Railroad Cor-
poration, 47 Barb.
CONTRIBUTION.
Marshalling Assets-ot enforced between Co-legatees when Legacy
of one has been taken by Title paramount to Title of Testator.-The
doctrine of marshalling of assets does not apply to a case between speci-
fic legatees under,a will where all the property bequeathed to them is
subject to an encumbrance paramount to the title of the testator, and the
property bequeathed to one of the legatees has alone been seized to
satisfy the encumbrance : People et al. v. Horton et al., 39 Mi.
Case in Judgment-Contribution between Co-legatees.-A. died, giving
all his estate to B., who afterwards died, leaving specific legacies of the
personalty so bequeathed to him to several legatees. Afterwards a judg-
ment was rendered against the administrator of A., which was wholly
satisfied by a levy on the property lequeathed to one of the legatees :-
Held, that he was not entitled to contribution from his co-legatees, whose
legacies were equally with his liable to the satisfaction of the judgment.
In such a case the creditor has a right to levy his execution on any part
of the property, and if he levy solely on the legacy of one it is a mis-
fortune for which the legatee has no remedy against his co-legatees: Id.
When Co-egqatees entitled to Contribution against each Other.-Where
one of several specific legatees has been compelled to pay the whole of a
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debt due by the .testator, he will not be entitled to contribution against
his co-legatees who have received their legacies, if the estate be solvent
independent of their legacies, nor in case it become insolvent by the
devastavit of the executor: Id.
COR:PORATION.
Pleading and Practice- Character of Party set out in Pleading not
traversable -unless denied under Oath.-A subscriber for stock was gar-
nisheed by a creditor of the company, and he answered in the usual form,
denying any indebtedness. The creditor took. issue upon the answer,
alleging that the garnishee was indebted to the company on account of
his subscription for stock in the same :-eld, that on the trial of this
issue the garnishee could not object that .the company had never been
legally incorporated, he having failed to deny under oath the legal
incorporation of the company as required by art. 237, p. 518, of the
Rev. Code: Saffold v. Barnes, 39 Mi.
Subscriber for Stock is not released by Fraud in procuring his Sub-
scription.-A member of an incorporated company is bound by the acts
of its officers and agents within the scope of their authority; and he
cannot therefore set up, against a creditor of the company who seeks to
subject to the payment of his debt the indebtedness of such member on
a9count of his subscription for stock in the same, that his subscription
was obtained by fraud of the agent of the company, nor any secret
agreement between him and such agent, by which he was to be released
from his subscription in case certain conditions promised by the agent
were not complied with. See Walker v. Mobire and Ohio Railroad Co.,
34 Miss. Rep. 245; Ellison v. Same, 36 Id. 572 : Id.
COUNTERFEIT MoNzy.-See Agent.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Two Statutes imposing Penalty- Questin of Real of First by the
Second.-A statute imposing the penalty of a certain fine and minimum
term of imprisonment for a first offenc6 is not repealed by the enactment
of a subsequent statute, providing that on conviction of such an offence
the court may in its discretion impose the penalty either of the fine or
the imprisonment, where the offender shall prove to the satisfaction of
the court that he has not before been convicted of a similar offence, and
also providing that all inconsistent statutes are repealed: Dotan v.
Thomas, 12 Allen.
A statute imposing, for an offence, the penalty of imprisonment in the
house of correction in the county where the offence was committed, is
not repealed by the enactment of a subsequent statute, previding that
the court in its discretion may commit the person under sentence to the
house of correction in any county in the Commonwealth, in the same
manner as such person might be committed in the county where the
court is holden, and that all inconsistent statutes are repealed: Carter
v. Burt, 12 Allen.
A statute imposing, for an offence, the penalty of a, fine or imprison-
ment not exceeding one year is repealed by the enactment of a subse-
quent statute, which contains no saving clause as to offences already
committed, and imposes for the like offence the penalty of a fine and
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imprisonment, not.less than three nor more than twelve months, unless
the offender shall prove to the satisfaction of the court that he has not
before been convicted of a similar offence, in which case he may, in the
discretion of the court, be sentenced to be punished by imprisonment
without fine, or by fine without imprisonment. And after the enactment
of such subsequent statute, one who committed the offence before its
enactment cannot be punished: Flaherty v. Thomas, 12 Allen.
DEBT.
When to be deemed contracted.-The discounting of a new note, and
the application of the proceeds to the payment of a former note, extin-
guishes the old debt, and creates a new one: Fisher v. Marvin et al., 47
Barb.
Under such circumstances, the contract does not relate back to the
time when the first note was discounted; but, the old note having been
paid and taken up, the debt will be deemed to have been contracted
when the new note was given: Id.
And if a debt thus contracted by a manufacturing corporation, by the
giving of a new note, is payable within one year after the date of such
new note, and a suit is brought on the note against the company, within
one year after the same becomes due, the stockholders are personally
liable: Id.
ESTATE FO. LIFE.
What is Capital to which, *the Remainder-Man is entitled.-If new
shares are created in the capital stock of a corporation, and the right to
subscribe for such new shares at par is given to the existing stock-
holders pro rata, and is valuable, and certain shares are held in trust,
to pay the income thereof to A. during life, with remainder to B., the
amount received on the sale Qf the right to take the proportionate num-
ber of new shares is to be held in trust as capital, the interest or income
whereof shall be paid to A. during life, with remainder to B. : Atkins
v. Albree, 12 Allen.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
May sue for Trespass to Realty.-The right to recover damages for a
trespass committed on realty in the lifetime of the intestate survives to
his administrator: N. 0. J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Moye, 39 Mi.
Failure to apply Assets to Debts a Breach of Official Bond.-It is the
duty of an administrator to apply the assets in his hands to the payment
of the intestates debts; and a suit on the administration-bond by a judg-
ment-creditor alleging a sufficiency of assets and the failure of the
administrator to pay the debt, is an action to recover for a breach of this
duty; and hence it is no answer to such an action that the admin-
istrator has not wasted or misapplied the assets; his retention of the
assets in his own hands, and his failure to apply them to the payment of
the debt, constitute in law a breach of the bond: Cannon v. Cooper et
al., 39 Mi.
Making Joint Bond, each liable for the other.-The execution of a
joint administration-bond by two administrators renders each of them
liable for the faithful performance of the duty of his associate as well as
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of himself; and -hence, though one of the administrators may have
received all of the assets and conducted the entire administration of the
estate, the other is liable to account. See Boyd v. Boyd, 1 Watts 365;
Still's Appeal, 10 Penna. St. Rep. (Barr) 152; Green v. Harberry, 2
Brock. 403; Lidderdale v. Robinson, Id. 159; Babcock v. Hubbard, 2
Conn. Rep. 536: Jeffries v. Lawson, 39 Mi.
Effect of Acknowledgment of Liability for Acts of Administrator when
made by a Lawyer.-When a positive and absolute acknowledgment of
liability for the acts of his co-administrator is made by one cognisant of
all the facts, and entirely competent to form an opinion as to the extent
of his liability (as by a lawyer of eminence), the acknowledgment is
conclusive, unless it be shown affirmatively that it was founded on mis-
take: Id.
Liable to account for Assets left by Heir in his hands to pay illegal
Legacy.-If, in a partial voluntary settlement between an executor and
the heir, funds be left in the hands of the foriner to pay certain legacies
in the will which are illegal, the funds so retained continue to be assets
in his hands, and, upon his failure to pay the illegal legacies, ie will be
liable to account for them to the heir: Welts v. ffitchell, 39 Mi.
INSURANCE.
Liability of Insurers for Money paid for Injury by Colliion- What
may be included in the Damages--The rule that insurers are liable for
the amount paid for an injury done by a vessel insured to another vessel
by reason of collision is settled in this (ommonwealth, and will not now
be reconsidered: Blanchard v. Equitable Safety Ins. Co., 19 Allen.
In an action on a policy of insurance- on a vessel, issued here, for a
sum expressed in dollars, to recover the amount paid in a foreign coun-
try for an injury done to another vessel by a collision, the insured may
also recover, as a part of his damages, the fees of counsel and commis-
sions of an agent, if fairly and properly incurred in defending against
the claim for the injury, and also the premium for exclinge paid by
the insured in order to enable him to remit the amount to such foreign
country: Id.
Conveyance of Vessel by Insured and Reconveyance to him-Validity
of Poliq.-If a mortgagor of a vessel sells his remaining interest therein,
with a stipulation that he will pay off the mortgage, and fails to com-
ply with this stipulation, and the bargain is accordingly given up and
the title reconveyed to him, a policy of insurance issued to him before
his agreement of sale will be valid to cover a loss of the vessel after the
reconveyancee of the title to him: Worthington v., Bearse, 12 Allen.
Waiver of Objections by Insurers- Condemnation and Sale of Vessel
as-unnavfgable in a Port of Necessity What may be recoveed.-A
general refusal by insurers to pay a loss, and a subsequent negotiation
with the insured for a settlement, without objection to the form of the
preliminary proof of loss, will be a waiver of such objection: Graves v.
Mashington Marine Ins. Co., 12 Allen.
If the defendants, in an action upon a policy of insurance, have put
in evidence some of the papers which constituted the preliminary proof
of loss, without objecting to their sufficiency at any time during the
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trial, it will be too, late to raise the objection at the argument in this
court on exceptions; although the judge at the trial refused to require
the pliintiff to read the paper to the jury: Id.
If a vessel which is insured by a valued policy becomes unnavigable
by reason of perils of the sea, while on her voyage, and. requires repairs
which will cost more than her valuation, and is thereupon condemned
and sold in a port of necessity, without any repairs being made, and
without an abandonment, the owner may recover the full sum insured,
deducting the proceeds from the sale, if the amount so found does not
exceed his net loss; and it is not necessary to inquire into her diminished
value at the home port: Id.
LimITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Effect of concealed Fraud.-If the fraud by which the plaintiff is
prevented from asserting his rights during the time prescribed by the
Statute of Limitations be so concealed by the positive act of the defend-
ant that plaintiff could not have discovered it by reasonable diligence,
the Statute of Limitations will not commence running until the disco-
very of the fraud: Edwards v, Gibbs et al., 39 li.
The bill charged that W., at the time of his application, and at the
date of his discharge as a bankrupt, had an estate in remainder, to vest
after the death of his mother, in a large amount of property. This
estate was secured to him by the will of his stepfather, which was pro-
bated in 1835. W., being then largely indebted, fraudulently withheld
it from record after it had been probated, and kept it concealed until
1856, when he supposed all his debts were barred, and then placed it on
record. W., being well apprised of his interest in the property, fraudu-
lently omitted it from his bankrupt schedule, and thereby concealed it
from his creditors. The complainant recovered a judgment against W.
in 1839, but had no notice of these frauds nor means of knowing them,
nor was there anything to put him on inquiry as to the interest of W.
in the property until the year 1856, when the will was recorded. The
bill was filed in March 1857 : Held, on demurrer to the bill, that it was
not barred by the Statute of Limitations. See Buckner & Stanton v.
Calcote, 28 Miss. Rep. 431: .d.
M rmRIE WOMN.
Capacity/ to Contract.-A married woman cannot bind herself, or
create a charge upon her separate estate, by a promise to pay for nursing
and taking care of her sick and infirm father, where she does not agree
or indicate an intention to bind her separate estate: Manchester v. Sahler,
47 Barb.
Nor is she liable, in such a case, on the ground that under the statute
she is bound to maintain her father, where it appears that she did not
assume to pay, for that reason and upon that consideration, and did not
agree to bind her separate estate: .d.
The Statutes of 1848 and 1849, were not intended to confer any
greater authority upon femes covert, to enter into contracts generally,
than previously existed; and did not remove their legal incapacity to
contract debts: Id.
They do not authorize a married woman to charge her separate estate
for a debt which did not arise in connection with it, and which is not
for her own benefit, or the benefit of the estate: .d.
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MORTGAGE.
Voluntary Promise of Mortgagee not to Sell without BTotice to MTrort-
gagor-F-raudulent Sale.-If a mortgagee of land voluntarily promises
the mortgagor not to act under a power of sale contained in the mort-
gage without notice to him, but is afterwards induced by falsehood to
assign the mortgage to persons who thereupon proceed to sell the land,
under the power of sale, without notice to the mortgagor and clandes-
tinely, whereby the latter is deprived of his equity of redemption, he
can maintain no action at law against the parties guilty of the fraud:
Randall v. Hazelton, 12 Allen.
RIVERS.
Navigable River-Meaning of the Term.-The term "navigable," by
the common law, had reference only to such waters as were by the law
of. nations free to the commerce and navigation of all nations, and not
to the capacity of a river or other stream for navigation; and hence
"navigabIe river" means only that part of a fresh-water stream debouch-
ing into the sea, in which the tide ebbs and flows: Steamer Magnolia v.
Marshall, 39 Mi.
Fresh-water Rivers-Rights of riparian Owner and Public in.-The
rules of the common law, which secured the property of the shores of
the sea and of navigable rivers in the crown for the public, were never
applied to fresh-water streams, though in fact capable of navigation.
The soil under these streams belonged to the riparian proprietors, ancl
not to'the crown; this right, however, is subject to an easement in the
public to navigate such streams as were in fact navigable. Id.
Grant conveys usque ad filum.-A grant of land, bounded "by"
or "on" a fresh-water stream, whether in fact capable of navigation or
not, conveys the soil usgue ad medium filum, aquce, and of course
conveys to the grantee the shore between high and low water mark: Id.
Navigator cannot land on, or the Public ayoproach Stream over, Shore.-
The right in the public to navigate a fresh-water stream capable of naviga-
tion does not deprive the owner of the shore between high and low water
mark of his exclusive right and dominion aver it, nor secure to the navi-
gator the right to land his vessel and use the shore for the purpose of
taking on or discharging a cargo; nor does-it secure the public the right
to approach the stream over the land of the riparian proprietor against
his consent: -d.
Right of riparian Proprietor to charge for use of Shore.--The owner
of the shore of a fresh-water rivei, capable of navigation, has the right
to charge such sums as he sees proper, to navigators, for using the shore
in lading and unlading their vessels, if he give notice of his charge
before such use is made of his property: Id.
Mississippi River not a navigable River.-The Mississippi River is
not, above tide water, a navigable stream, in the technical sense of that
term, and is in all respects subject to the rules of the common law regu-
lating the rights of the public and of riparian proprietors in fresh-water
streams capable of being navigated: Id.
Authorities cited.-The authorities, both English and American, in
relation to navigable streams and fresh-water streams capable of being
navigated, and to the rights of the public and the riparian proprietors,
collected and reviewed in this case: Id.
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-STATUTES.-See Crimizal Law.
SURETY.
Admissions of PrincipaZ as Evidence against-Several Bond-Lia-
bility of Surety on.-In an action against a surety who has signed the
bond of the cashier of a bank, severally and not jointly, to secure the
cashier's faithful performance of the duties of his office, the plaintiffs,
after proving that it was the custom of the directors to have an exami-
nation of the affairs of the bank once in six months, and of the cashier
to lay before them twice a week a general statement of the condition of
the bank, and that on a particular day the cashier presented to the
directors a statement which purported to show the condition of the
bank, may introduce evidence of his admissions made at that time, in
reply to questions put to him by the directors concerning such state-
ment, that the same was false, and that he had embezzled certain sums,
and forced the accounts: The Bank of Brighton v. Smith, 12 Allen.
If-an official bond is taken in the penal sum of $20,000, and is signed
by ten sureties, who bind themselves severally and not jointly in the
sum of $2000 each, a surety may be held liable in the full sum of $2000,
if an unsatisfied defalcation of the principal exceeds that sum, although
such defalcation is less than $20,000: -d.
Although a bond in a penal sum does not carry interest as a part of
the contract, interest on the amount of the penal sum may be added by
way of damages for the detention thereof, after it is the duty of a surety
to pay the same: Id.
TAXATION.
Savings Bank-Tax assessed on its whole Deposits though part of its
-Funds invested in United States Securities.-Although a savings bank
has invested a portion of ifs-funds in United States securities, the tax
imposed by Sts. 1862, c. 224, and 1863, c. 164, may be assessed upon
the whole average amount of its deposits, as therein provided, and may'
be collected in full: Commonwealth v. Provident Institution for Savings,
12 Allen.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Notice to quit-Demand of Possesion, or of Amount due-Tender
of Deed.-Where the purchaser of land has made default in the pay-
ment of money, under an executory contract, no notice to quit, nor any
demand of the amount due, or of the possession, or tender of a deed, is
necessary on the part of the vendor, before bringing an action of eject-
ment: .Hotaling v. .otaling, 47 Barb.
Construction of Agreement.-By a parol contract between the parties,
certain premises were sold by the plaintiff to the defendant for 855 a
portion of which sum 4vas paid at the time of the sale, without any
agreement as to the time when the remainder should be paid. Reid,
that the legal effect of the contract was to make the balance payable
whenever the purchaser should take possession of the premises: .Td.
And the purchaser having entered into possession without paying
such balance: held, that he was in default from that time; and that .a
demand of the money and tender of a deed by the vendor was unne-
cessary, as a preliminary to an action of ejectment: Id.
